Bitcoin and the age of bespoke silicon Proceedings of ...

Bitcoin and The Age of Bespoke Silicon

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Merged Mining: Curse or Cure?

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/791
Date: 2017-08-22
Author(s): Aljosha Judmayer, Alexei Zamyatin, Nicholas Stifter, Artemios Voyiatzis, Edgar Weippl

Link to Paper


Abstract
Merged mining refers to the concept of mining more than one cryptocurrency without necessitating additional proof-of-work effort. Although merged mining has been adopted by a number of cryptocurrencies already, to this date little is known about the effects and implications. We shed light on this topic area by performing a comprehensive analysis of merged mining in practice. As part of this analysis, we present a block attribution scheme for mining pools to assist in the evaluation of mining centralization. Our findings disclose that mining pools in merge-mined cryptocurrencies have operated at the edge of, and even beyond, the security guarantees offered by the underlying Nakamoto consensus for extended periods. We discuss the implications and security considerations for these cryptocurrencies and the mining ecosystem as a whole, and link our findings to the intended effects of merged mining.

References
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Merged Mining: Analysis of Effects and Implications

Date: 2017-08-24
Author(s): Alexei Zamyatin, Edgar Weippl

Link to Paper


Abstract
Merged mining refers to the concept of mining more than one cryptocurrency without necessitating additional proof-of-work effort. Merged mining was introduced in 2011 as a boostrapping mechanism for new cryptocurrencies and countermeasures against the fragmentation of mining power across competing systems. Although merged mining has already been adopted by a number of cryptocurrencies, to this date little is known about the effects and implications.
In this thesis, we shed light on this topic area by performing a comprehensive analysis of merged mining in practice. As part of this analysis, we present a block attribution scheme for mining pools to assist in the evaluation of mining centralization. Our findings disclose that mining pools in merge-mined cryptocurrencies have operated at the edge of, and even beyond, the security guarantees offered by the underlying Nakamoto consensus for extended periods. We discuss the implications and security considerations for these cryptocurrencies and the mining ecosystem as a whole, and link our findings to the intended effects of merged mining.

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Flux: Revisiting Near Blocks for Proof-of-Work Blockchains

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/415
Date: 2018-05-29
Author(s): Alexei Zamyatin∗, Nicholas Stifter, Philipp Schindler, Edgar Weippl, William J. Knottenbelt∗

Link to Paper


Abstract
The term near or weak blocks describes Bitcoin blocks whose PoW does not meet the required target difficulty to be considered valid under the regular consensus rules of the protocol. Near blocks are generally associated with protocol improvement proposals striving towards shorter transaction confirmation times. Existing proposals assume miners will act rationally based solely on intrinsic incentives arising from the adoption of these changes, such as earlier detection of blockchain forks.
In this paper we present Flux, a protocol extension for proof-of-work blockchains that leverages on near blocks, a new block reward distribution mechanism, and an improved branch selection policy to incentivize honest participation of miners. Our protocol reduces mining variance, improves the responsiveness of the underlying blockchain in terms of transaction processing, and can be deployed without conflicting modifications to the underlying base protocol as a velvet fork. We perform an initial analysis of selfish mining which suggests Flux not only provides security guarantees similar to pure Nakamoto consensus, but potentially renders selfish mining strategies less profitable.

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The Age of Cryptocurrency - Let's Talk Bitcoin Episode 182 Tech Visionary George Gilder: FOLLOW THE COIN SYMPOSIUM: A Discourse on 'The Age of Cryptocurrency' How I made a bitcoin warning alarm. (silicon valley). Python is Sexy ep-1 John Collison of Stripe on Bitcoin

DOI: 10.1109/CASES.2013.6662520 Corpus ID: 10341246. Bitcoin and the age of Bespoke Silicon @article{Taylor2013BitcoinAT, title={Bitcoin and the age of Bespoke Silicon}, author={M. Taylor}, journal={2013 International Conference on Compilers, Architecture and Synthesis for Embedded Systems (CASES)}, year={2013}, pages={1-10} } Bitcoin and The Age of Bespoke Silicon Michael Bedford Taylor University of California, San Diego ABSTRACT Recently, the Bitcoin cryptocurrency has been an interna-tional sensation. This paper tells the story of Bitcoin hard-ware: how a group of early-adopters self-organized and - nanced the creation of an entire new industry, leading to the development of machines, including ASICs, that had ... Bitcoin and the Age of Bespoke Silicon Michael B. Taylor Associate Professor University of California, San Diego . This Talk Introduction An Overview of the Bitcoin Cryptocurrency Bitcoin’s Computing Evolution Bespoke Silicon. Interesting Facts about Bitcoin The most successful digital currency ever Since its deployment in Jan. 2009, – 11.7 Million … Bitcoins (BTC) are in circulation ... Bitcoin is a distributed, worldwide, decentralized digital money … Press J to jump to the feed. Press question mark to learn the rest of the keyboard shortcuts. r/Bitcoin. log in sign up. User account menu. 8. Bitcoin and The Age of Bespoke Silicon. Close. 8. Posted by. u/rmvaandr. 6 years ago. Archived. Bitcoin and The Age of Bespoke Silicon. cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mbtay... 1 comment. share. save ... Bitcoin and the age of bespoke silicon. Pages 1–10. Previous Chapter Next Chapter. ABSTRACT. Recently, the Bitcoin cryptocurrency has been an international sensation. This paper tells the story of Bitcoin hardware: how a group of early-adopters self-organized and financed the creation of an entire new industry, leading to the development of machines, including ASICs, that had orders of ...

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The Age of Cryptocurrency - Let's Talk Bitcoin Episode 182

In Microcosm: The Quantum Revolution in Economics and Technology (1989) he described how the silicon chip would usher in a new information age. In TELECOSM: How Infinite Bandwidth will ... I made the bitcoin warning alarm as shown in the silicon valley show. we are giving our best to deliver these episodes.we are very new to video production. so enjoy it. Episode 2 will be streamed ... Onecoin promised the world, but only proved to be a trail of destruction. --- About ColdFusion --- ColdFusion is an Australian based online media company ind... - The current state of the age of cryptocurrency - The importance of Bitcoin as a technology - Why Bitcoin is the chosen currency, over any other currency - The culture around Bitcoin and Bitcoin ... Having founded his first company, Clicks2Customers.com, in 2003 at the age of 24, along with incuBeta, he has since broadened his horizons and rebased himself in Silicon Valley and co-founded Yola ...

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